The current wave of telecom liberalization actually represents a return to private provision and competition in many countries rather than a new phenomenon. The early 20 th century saw great variation in sector structure, with state-owned monopolies in some countries and vigorous competition in others. This paper uses an original dataset compiled from turn-of-the-(20 th ) century industry documents and scholarly works to test the effects of government monopoly service, private provision, and operating licenses on early telephone development. Controlling for per capita income and, when possible, country and year fixed effects, I find state monopoly provision correlated with lower telephone penetration and higher long-distance prices than privately-provided service. Contrary to conventional wisdom, state-owned monopolies also provided worse rural service. Operating licenses that allowed the state to appropriate firms' assets lead to lower telephone penetration and higher prices.
Introduction
The last decade has witnessed dramatic changes in telecommunications sectors around the world. Both industrialized and developing countries are privatizing state-owned incumbent telecom providers, introducing competition to the sector, and-especially in the case of developing countries where there was little-building regulatory capacity. The trend towards liberalization in modern telecommunications began in the late 1950s when the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) allowed large firms to bypass AT&T, the monopoly telecom provider, with microwave transmission for long-distance service (Crandall and Waverman 1995) . It gained steam in the 1980s when the UK's Thatcher government began a wave of privatization of state-owned firms (Megginson and Netter 2000) . These efforts, in general, appear to be succeeding in improving telecom service. Competition tends to greatly improve telephone penetration, as does privatization in the presence of effective regulatory institutions (Petrazzini 1996; Wallsten 2001; Wellenius and Stern 1994) .
Most empirical research on telecommunications begins studying the sector in the 1980s, which was when widespread reforms of state-owned monopolies began. But the trend towards privately-run telecommunications networks around the world actually represents a return to private provision, not a completely new phenomenon. Private firms (usually subsidiaries of the Bell telephone company) typically first introduced telephone service into countries in the early 1880s. Some countries quickly nationalized their networks, but others actively promoted private ownership and competition. As a result, telephone provision around the world in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries was a mix of government and private ownership, where private ownership almost always meant a competitive market in the sense that multiple firms could obtain concessions within a country. Private firms often faced "regulations" through rules spelled out in operating licenses and concessionary agreements.
This paper combines historical data from several sources to test the effects of government monopoly ownership and regulation on telephone provision. Econometric analysis of crosssectional data from 33 countries in 1913 and panel data on European countries from certain years 1892-1914 reveals that government monopolies lead to worse telephone penetration and higher prices, even controlling for per capita income and year and country fixed effects. Provision by private providers, meanwhile, could be severely hampered by capricious regulations (where "capricious" means that the government retained the right to take over the concession with no payment to the operator). The countries with the most liberal policies towards private provision-Norway, Sweden, and Denmark-had the highest telephone penetration in Europe through the entire sample period. Moreover, rural areas, which many people still believe would not be served under a competitive environment, had better service across Europe on average under private provision than under government monopoly.
The Telephone and the Telegraph
Conventional wisdom holds that an early belief that telephone service was a natural monopoly lead countries to prefer that one firm provide telephone service, which in Europe meant a state-owned, rather than a regulated private, monopoly. Indeed, network externalities mean that the total benefits of each new connection exceed the benefits that accrue to the newly connected person since everyone else can now reach that person. Achieving these benefits requires that each person to be able to reach every other person, which means that some sort of unified service is required to achieve the greatest benefits. However, it is not clear that there
were economies of scale in supply in the early going. The number of possible connections increased exponentially with the number of telephones on the network, making manual switching increasingly costly with network size (Mueller 1997) .
In any event, the early sector structure was not determined by policy analysis intent on maximizing welfare. Instead, it tended to be determined by how countries had handled telegraph service and how they viewed telephony relative to telegraphy. Webb (1910, p.14) succinctly summed up the general story of Europe's initial experience with the telephone: "The telephone was taken to the Government Telegraph departments and offered for sale, but the Telegraph departments declined to take the risk of developing a totally new business. At the same time, however, they assumed control over the telephone and issued licenses to companies formed to exploit the new invention, these licenses being generally for restricted periods and surrounded by the most onerous conditions." Then, once it became clear that the public did, in fact, value telephone service, the government telegraph agency took it over.
Private firms-usually subsidiaries of the Bell Telephone Company-were the first to introduce telephony in Europe, as few governments anticipated the incredible demand for the technology. Alexander Graham Bell took his newly-invented telephone to England in 1878, but found little interest in it (Casson 1910 ). Britain's Postmaster General told Parliament that year that "it is evident that the instrument is at present unsuitable for the purposes of public telegraphy, and I do not, therefore, propose to introduce it in that branch of the Postal Telegraph
Service" (Holcombe 1906) . Several governments, whose telegraph departments viewed the telephone as just a "scientific toy," at best (Webb 1910) , including Britain, Austria, Belgium, and
France gave private concessions in the early 1880s (Bennett 1895 ).
The high public demand for telephony soon became apparent, and state telegraph agencies saw a potential threat to their revenues. Laws that granted the state the right to control the telegraph were quickly extended to include the telephone in order to protect the telegraph.
Austria and Belgium nationalized its private providers soon after granting concessions, and
France took over all private exchanges by force in 1889 when the firms refused to hand over their assets (Bennett 1895) . Some countries that had not yet allowed any substantial telephone investment, including Bulgaria, Germany, Switzerland, and Luxembourg established state-owned monopolies.
The Differing Structure of the Telephone Sector
The first experiences with the telephone left countries in Europe with very different sector structures. Some countries cautiously allowed private firms to provide service under strict concessionary agreements. Other countries-the Scandinavian countries in particularencouraged private sector investment and initially allowed firms the freest hand in building out their networks. The remaining countries provided telephone service through state monopolies.
Governments that operated monopolies ranged from those like France that showed little interest in telephony, to those like Germany and Switzerland that saw the potential benefits of telephony.
The sections below detail these different approaches.
Private service under harsh concessions: Great Britain, Italy, Spain
Some countries allowed private firms to operate under stringent conditions. Bell and
Edison subsidiaries in Great Britain merged in 1880 to form the United Telephone Company (UTC). Though it held a monopoly concession, the firm operated in a harsh political environment. The British government had nationalized the telegraph system in 1871 and was concerned about recouping its investment (Bertho-Lavenir 1988) . As a result, UTC's license allowed it to build lines only to 2-5 miles from any city center, required a royalty of 10 percent of gross receipts, and allowed the government to buy the system at an undefined "fair price" in 1890. When the government saw a decrease in telegraph revenues in 1882 it made the concession even more stringent: UTC had to sell the post office as many telephones as the post office wanted on terms fixed by arbitration, and was prohibited from building public call boxes.
It soon became clear, however, that public sentiment strongly favored telephone development, and in 1884 Parliament revised the regulatory structure in hopes of stimulating competition.
Under the new regulations, UTC's concession remained the same, but the government intended to also grant municipal concessions (Holcombe 1906) .
Unfortunately, this policy failed to stimulate competition, as only six out of a possible 1,334 municipalities set up telephone exchanges in response to this new system (Holcombe 1907 ). There appear to be two reasons for this failure. First, the UTC, reorganized as the National Telephone Company ("National"), made competition difficult. Many of National's regional concessions covered multiple municipalities, meaning that cities felt they had to organize service collectively to compete effectively. Probably more importantly, however, was the fact that all concessions were set to expire in 1911, with no agreement as to what would happen afterwards. In 1904 National warned that it would not sign up new customers since it had to recoup all of its investments by 1911. By the end of that year 10,000 people were on the waiting list for telephone service. (Holcombe 1906) .
Italy allowed private operation of telephony, though the state's overriding goal appeared to be protecting telegraph revenues. Indeed, the telegraph authority "reserved the right to require the telephone companies to make alterations when they should deem it necessary for the protection of the telegraph service at the companies' own expense" (Webb 1910, pp.366-367) .
Moreover, while concessions were granted for up to 25 years, the government could suspend them whenever it wanted and could completely revoke the concession after 12 years. At the end of the concession all the equipment would revert to the state without payment (Bennett 1895 While perhaps best left to a non-economist to test "the Scandinavian blood," Scandinavian telecommunication public policies appear to have been well-designed to promote telephony. For example, Sweden, Norway, and Finland charged no royalties on private firms operating telephone network (Kingsbury 1915) . And in an interesting twist on later divisions between local and long-distance service, the Swedish and Danish governments built and operated trunk lines connecting the many local independent private exchanges.
Sweden had no legal monopoly on telegraph, and the Bell company opened exchanges in Bell also sold its Drammen operations to the Drammen Uplands Telephone Company, which then began extending its lines to rural areas outside the town. Bennet (1895, p. 281) noted that "the company has shown how a large tract of sparsely populated country, containing nothing larger than a village, can be telephoned and maintained year after year at a handsome profit."
The Norwegian government was not entirely accommodating at first, but ultimately did not block private telephone development. While an 1881 law gave the government the right to a monopoly in telegraph and telephone, it was also allowed to grant private concessions. The government made some early attempts to protect its telegraph system, mandating that telephone systems had to remain within 11 kilometers of a city center and prohibited cities' telephone systems from coming within 2 kilometers of each other (Webb 1910) . But these laws quickly broke down as firms found ways around the restrictions. Indeed, the telegraph service began using telephone lines for telegraphy rather than build new lines.
Government ownership
As the analysis below will demonstrate, public ownership tended to generate worse outcomes than private (competitive) provision. In large part state telephone provision was poor because it was provided by the telegraph agency, which wanted to protect telegraph revenues.
This was unarguably the case in France, for example, which as early as 1884 rejected one private concession because it did not provide "an adequate safeguard for the revenues from the public telegraph." The concessions that it did grant were short-typically four years in length-and restrictive (Bertho-Lavenir 1988 But not all governments that operated telephone networks were so myopic. Germany and Switzerland both operated state-owned networks, and policymakers in both countries recognized potential benefits of telephony, viewing it as a complement, rather than a competitor, of the telegraph. Indeed, both countries saw telephone service as a way to extend their telegraph lines and favored early investment for that purpose (Holcombe 1911; Webb 1910 ).
Germany first introduced telephone service in 1877 as an "auxiliary telegraph apparatus,"
intended to bring telegraph service to suburban and rural areas. In 1879 Bell asked for a concession to build true telephone service, but the Post Office declared the telephone to be "technically immature and therefore incompatible with the technically more sophisticated system of the telegraph, and backers of state intervention, who stressed the threat to the Reich finance and danger of a loss of political and economic control to a foreign company, . . . decided to interpret the legal situation of the telephone as being part of the existing state monopoly on telegraphy that was fixed by the Constitution" (Thomas 1988, p.183) . Telephone service thus languished, with little investment from the state beyond its complementary use for telegraphy.
Because it was primarily a means of enhancing long-distance telegraphy, penetration and local service suffered. As late as mid-1890s the local exchange in Berlin operated only from 7:00am until 10:00pm, while other major cities had around-the-clock service (Bennett 1895).
Nor were individuals allowed to share service, which could have increased demand: German law made it illegal to lease a phone to neighbors, punishable by six months in jail (Casson 1910 ).
Finally, service suffered when the state delayed introducing new technologies. Webb (1910, p.64) noted that "single wire overhead line plant was largely maintained in service in Germany long after metallic circuit working and underground cable distribution has been generally adopted in other countries."
It is clear that governments around the world, and in Europe in particular, took vastly different approaches to the introduction of telephony. In the remainder of this paper I discuss data from this early period and empirically test the effects of government monopoly provision and regulation on telephone service.
Data
The data I use in this paper come from several sources. AT&T was the first to compile provide penetration data separately for cities with populations greater than 100,000 and for areas outside those cities in selected (primarily European) countries. I pieced together earlier data from scholarly works, including Bennett (1895), Holcombe (1906; 1907; 1911) , Casson (1910) , Webb (1910), and Kingsbury (1915) . These sources also provided information on the ownership and regulatory structure of each European country. Bennett (1895) telephone investment after the patents expired as Bell competitors emerged around the country (Gabel 1994; Gabel 1969; Jayakar 1999) . Perhaps one of the more remarkable stories in Figures 3 and 4 is that telephone penetration in US 3 The numbers are technically for January 1, 1914, and thus are statistics before WWI broke out.
cities was not so different from the major European cities with monopoly providers until after
Bell's patent expired and competition broke out.
Prices and Services
As mentioned above, Bennett (1895) compiled copious information on services and prices for European telephony. (1895), "a message telephoned by a subscriber to the central office to be written down and delivered by messenger to a non-subscriber"), telephoning mail (a subscriber calls the central office where an operator writes down the message and mails it as a letter or postcard), and telephoning of telegrams.
While the differing structure of prices makes comparisons of many services difficult, it is easier to compare long-distance prices. Table 3 shows prices of long-distance service, in current pence, for selected European countries, derived from a table in Bennett (1895, p.16 ). While less difficult to compare than the prices above, several factors cloud the comparisons. First, some countries charge by the minute, while others charge in three-or five-minute increments. To facilitate the comparison I imputed each country's per-minute charge. Second, the price typically depended on the call distance, with prices increasing nonlinearly with mileage and at different increments across countries. The chart thus shows prices for calls covering distances ranging from 20 to 720 miles. Third, the maximum possible distance of an intra-national longdistance call differs by country, since countries are different sizes. Finally, Bennett (1895) undoubtedly also had to make assumptions to create his 
Empirical Analysis
The goal of this paper is to explore the effects of market structure on development of the telephone sector. Research on current telecommunications reforms usually tries to untangle the effects of government ownership, privatization, and competition. Generally speaking, in today's parlance government ownership means a state-owned monopoly telecom provider, privatization means transforming the state-owned incumbent firm into a private monopoly (hopefully as just a first step towards greater liberalization), and competition means any firm that can somehow reduce the incumbent's market power. I use slightly different terminology in this paper, reflecting the different nature of the industry a century ago.
Nationwide monopolies were almost always government-owned, as few countries allowed private firms a nationwide monopoly. In other words, there were essentially two states of the world in telephone provision: (1) countries with state-owned monopolies, and (2) countries with multiple providers, sometimes all private and sometimes with a state-owned firm as one of the competitors. It is important to note that some countries with multiple firms would grant those firms regional monopolies. Unfortunately I do not have any consistent information on this phenomenon. There is also one exception to the "private equals competition" rule: the UK had a national private monopoly until the state took it over in 1911. However, the UK's 1884 regulation attempted to entice municipal competition, so the national telephone company faced the threat of potential competition across the country, and actual competition in a few cities. A more important issue in the UK, as mentioned above, however, may have been the restrictive concessions, which introduced substantial risk into telephone investment.
I do not have detailed cross-country information on regulations. This lack of information is, in part, because telephones were new and regulations, in the modern sense, scarce. But this scarcity in some ways makes the empirical analysis simpler because the most important regulation was likely the concessions under which private firms operated. For the purposes of this paper I note whether a country had "capricious" regulations, which I define as whether the country had the right to appropriate the firm's assets without compensation. The countries in the sample with concessions like that include Spain, Italy, and the UK (prior to 1911). 4 
Telephone penetration
To estimate the effects of market structure on the development of the telephone, I
estimate several versions of equation (1) 
Rural service
An important part of the question of telecom reforms today is who can expect to receive service under a liberalized market environment. A common rationale for government provision of telecommunication services both today and in the past is that rural areas would not be served in a private, competitive market. The AT&T (1913) data separates telephone penetration information for each country into the average penetration rate in cities of over 100,000 people and the penetration rate outside the cities. While the rate outside those cities might include suburban areas, which we would today not call rural, I use the rate outside the cities as a measure of rural penetration, and run the same regressions as above. Table 5 shows the results of these regressions. Again, the regressions reveal a strongly negative effect of state monopoly telephone provision. The concern that the private sector would not provide service to rural areas seems completely unfounded; indeed it was the state monopolies that did not serve rural areas. The main reason for this result is the large number of local cooperatives that formed in rural areas to provide service when it was allowed. Service provided by cooperatives was often not of high quality, though presumably low-quality telephony was better than no telephony.
Telephone penetration: panel data 1892-1914
One potential shortcoming with the above regressions is that they use cross-sectional data. As a result, it is not possible to control for country fixed effects, which could impact telephone development. For example, the "capricious regulation" variable applies only to Italy and Spain in the 1913 regressions, meaning that the variable could simply be picking up factors unique to those countries suppressing telephone development but unrelated to the concessions, per se. The panel data allows me to control for country (and year) fixed effects, as well as adding the UK to part of the sample with capricious regulations, since prior to 1911 service was provided by a private firm operating under the assumption that its assets would essentially be confiscated in that year.
The unbalanced panel includes 17 countries for certain years 1892-1914, yielding 54 country-year observations. Table 6 lists the countries included in the panel and the years for which data are available. I use this panel to re-estimate the equation presented above, this time allowing the introduction of fixed effects. Table 7 shows the results of these regressions. The first two columns show exactly the same regressions as above (i.e., no fixed effects), with identical results. Penetration is worse under state-owned monopolies than under private competition, and even worse under private provision with capricious regulations. The last three columns of the table slowly introduce the fixed effects, first estimating the equation with country fixed effects, then year, and then both. The results remain unchanged: both state-owned monopoly service and capricious regulations yield relatively poor telephone penetration.
Long-distance prices
Comparing prices of telecommunications services even today is difficult, and prices a century ago were no simpler. As discussed above, pricing structures differed radically across countries, making comparisons difficult. Some countries charged a connection fee to establish service while others did not, some maintained a flat rate for local service while others introduced measured service fairly early, and so on. Nonetheless, it is possible to compare one element of price: long-distance service, as discussed above. I use that price data to estimate several versions of equation (2).
(2) long distance price i = β 0 + β 1 *(government monopoly i ) + β 2 *(capricious regulations i ) + β 3 *(gdp per capita i ) + ε I estimate this equation three times: once with the dependent variable defined as the per-minute price of a 40-mile call, once for an 80-mile call, and once for a 160-mile call. Table 8 shows the results of this series of regressions. In this case, per capita income is not significant. Long distance prices under state-owned monopolies are higher than under service provided in countries with private service and competition. Capricious regulations were associated with much higher prices. Indeed, the threat of government takeover without compensation added more than twice the amount that state-ownership added to the average price of a 160-mile call. This result is not surprising: a firm that must recoup all of its costs-marginal and fixed-in a short period of time will have to charge higher prices in the short time it has.
Discussion
Most research studying modern telecommunications reforms use information beginning in the 1980s at the earliest, when almost every country in the world save the United States had a state-owned monopoly telecom provider. In many ways this is sensible: consistent empirical data does not go back much further, and, in any event there was little change in sector structure between the end of the Second World War and the late 1980s. Case studies of telecom reforms, meanwhile, provide detailed information on the politics and institutions factored into reform decisions, and the very early history may be less relevant in these cases. Nonetheless, it is a mistake to ignore the early history of the telephone industry.
Many countries today are wary about liberalizing their telecommunications sector, believing that liberalized markets are untested in telecommunications. Policy makers worry that such reforms could lead to high consumer prices and that a competitive market would underserve rural areas. But telephone service was not born as a state-owned enterprise around the world. One issue I have not discussed is interconnection. The well-known problem with multiple telephone networks is that subscribers of one network may not be able to reach subscribers of the other network. That precise situation developed in the United States once the Bell patent expired in 1894. A vast network of non-Bell firms (the "independents") quickly emerged. The independents were largely connected to other independents, while the Bell systems around the country were also connected to each other. The Bell and independent systems did not interconnect. Anyone who wanted access to both networks had to subscribe to both and thus have two telephones. Little is written about this issue in early European telephone networks, presumably because there were so few places where multiple networks overlapped geographically. In that case, the only issue was connecting regions via long-distance lines, which is inherently less difficult than compelling a firm to connect direct competitors to its network. Still, even without interconnection, the early benefits of competition seem clear:
countries that licensed multiple private firms saw better telephone penetration than countries with state-owned monopoly providers, and Stockholm, which had two non-interconnected, geographically overlapping, providers for a time had probably the highest penetration rate in the world.
Summary and conclusion
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